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1. Executive Summary
The purpose of the fire and life-safety analysis was to perform a prescriptive-based and
performance based analysis on the fire and life safety systems in the Production Facility (PF) at
Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). The prescriptive-based analysis determined if the building
met applicable code requirements for existing life safety systems. The performance-based
analysis consisted of a series of fire scenarios to ensure the fire and life safety systems allowed
adequate egress time for occupants in the event of a fire.
The prescriptive-based analysis was based on the Life Safety Code (LSC) and the International
Building Code (IBC). The occupancy of each area was classified according to the use of the area
and the hazards that exist. The applicable codes were used to determine if the life safety
systems were appropriate for each occupancy classification. Life safety systems include: egress,
fire suppression, fire alarm, and structural fire protection. The capacity of the egress system
was calculated and compared to the occupant load. Analysis of the fire suppression system
determined if the automatic sprinkler system was designed and installed to National Fire
Protection Associate (NFPA) standards. The sprinkler water demand was calculated to ensure
the water supply for the building was adequate. The fire alarm system was analyzed for proper
spacing of detection and notification appliances. The electrical demand of the alarm system was
calculated to ensure the battery backup supply was sufficient. The structural fire protection
analysis confirmed proper materials and separation requirements existed in the building.
The performance-based analysis used stakeholders’ goals and objectives to select appropriate
fire scenarios to test the abilities of the installed fire protection systems. The first fire scenario
was a kitchenette fire open to the main corridor with ineffective sprinklers. The second scenario
was a kitchenette fire with the sprinklers active. The Society of Fire Protection Engineers (SFPE)
hydraulic model, DETACT, and Pathfinder were used to calculate the required safe egress time
(RSET). Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS) was used to calculate the available safe egress time
(ASET). A fire scenario was considered successful if the ASET was greater than the RSET.
For the first scenario mentioned above (kitchenette fire-no sprinklers), the fire starts with the
ignition of a microwave oven that subsequently causes a wood table and adjacent coffee maker
to ignite and burn. During fire modeling simulations, it was found that after 66 seconds (ASET)
the occupants would have to travel through a layer of smoke and hot gas in order to exit the
building. Visibility was the most limiting condition, therefore the life safety criteria for this
scenario was not met.
For the second scenario (kitchenette fire with sprinklers), the fire starts exactly like the first
scenario, except this time sprinklers activate and suppress the fire. During fire modeling
stimulations, it was found that after 128 seconds (ASET) the occupants would have to travel
through a layer of smoke and hot gas in order to get to the south exit. The exits are clear at 176
seconds (RSET). Due to the smoke layer height being at an acceptable level, this scenario was
considered successful.
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Recommendations for the aforementioned fire scenarios would be to keep exits clear, ensure
sprinklers are operational, limit the amount of secondary combustibles in the kitchenette area,
and replace suspect or malfunctioning appliances.
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2. Building Overview
The Production Facility (PF) is an existing structure located at Sandia National Laboratories
(SNL) in Albuquerque, New Mexico (SNL/NM). National Technology and Engineering Solutions
(NTESS) operates SNL for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and all the buildings at SNL are
designed to adhere to strict DOE Order requirements in addition to complying with nationally
adopted codes and standards. Figure 1 shows front and back satellite views of the facility.

N

Figure 1 – Satellite Views of the Production Facility

This facility has three distinct wings (North, West, and East). The North Wing is two stories in
height with a basement, while the East and West Wings are one story each and they do not
have basements. The PF was originally constructed in 1959, however in 1995, two (North and
West Wings) of the three wings were razed and rebuilt; the East Wing of the facility was left
standing, however it was completely gutted and remodeled. Figure 2 shows building interior
space types of the three levels of the PF-Building 870 (from left to right, is the Basement, 1st
floor, and 2nd floor). Refer to Appendix A for Location Maps that depict the physical location of
the PF at SNL.
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N

N

N
Figure 2 – Building Interior Space Types for the Three Levels of the PF

This structure’s building construction consists of a concrete slab-on-grade foundation; gypsum
board on metal studs cementicious stucco covered exterior walls, and a non-protected steel
frame superstructure. The roof assembly is an insulated metal deck supported by unprotected
steel beams and trusses.
The design of the building itself has been arranged to provide a two-hour cut-off barrier
between each of the wings as a means of reducing potential common mode failures as directed
by the user group. This arrangement, along with further interior subdivisions with one-hour
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rated fire walls for processes in the North and East Wings and automatic sprinkler protection
throughout, make the probability of a total conflagration fire event extremely low.
In addition to the automatic wet-pipe sprinkler system, the building is provided with a wet
standpipe system and an addressable fire alarm system. Lastly, there are a compliant number
of fire hydrants located near the facility.
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3. Applicable Codes, Standards, and References














29 CFR Part 1910, Occupational Safety and Health Standard
29 CFR Part 1926, Safety & Health Regulations for Construction
DOE Standard 1066-2012: Fire Protection Design Criteria
DOE Order 420.1.C: Facility Safety
Sandia National Labs Site Specific Specifications
2015 International Building (IBC®) and Fire Code (IFC®)
2013 - NFPA 13, Automatic Sprinkler Systems Handbook
2015 - NFPA 45, Standard on Fire Protection for Labs Using Chemicals
2015 - NFPA 72, National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code
2017 – NFPA 80A, Recommended Practice for Protection of Buildings from Exterior Fire
Exposures
2015 - NFPA 101, Life Safety Code (LSC)
NFPA Fire Protection Handbook (19th and 20th Editions)
SFPE Handbook of Fire Protection Engineering (4th & 5th Editions)
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4. Prescriptive-Based Analysis

4.1. Introduction to Prescriptive-Based Analysis
The following analysis is performed using the LSC and the IBC. A prescriptive-based
analysis compares the building to the applicable codes and standards and provides a better
understanding of where codes are met and not met within the building. The prescriptive based
analysis does not account for occupant characteristics as well as proposed uses for specific
rooms. This analysis typically considers the worst case scenarios in order to ensure all future
uses of the building will meet the code. Sandia utilizes both the IBC and the LSC for prescriptivebased design work. Both codes will be compared to this building and the more stringent code
will be applied.
4.2. Occupancy Classification - IBC
The PF contains offices, equipment rooms, mechanical/electrical rooms, meeting rooms, labs,
and clean rooms. Table 1 provides the classification of the occupancies within the building
based upon Chapter 3 of the 2015-IBC.
Table 1. Building Occupancies per the IBC

Description of Use

Occupancy Classification

Conference Room

Assembly (Use Group A-3)

Office

Business (Use Group B)

* Incidental Use Room/Area

Business (Use Group B)

** Lab and Clean Room

Business (Use Group B)

*Incidental use rooms/areas for this facility consist of storage and equipment rooms in
accordance with Table 509 of the 2015-IBC.
**The labs and clean rooms were re-classified as Group B occupancies (per 304.1 of the 2015IBC) rather than their original H-6 (per the 1991-UBC code-of-record) occupancy classification
due to their inadequate separation with other areas (specifically at the floor/ceiling assemblies)
and maximum allowable quantities (MAQ) of hazardous materials were found to be below the
allowable limits stated in Section 307 of the 2015-IBC. The Group A-3 Assembly occupancy
listed in Table 1 above constitutes approximately 2,790-sq ft. of the 1st floor of the PF. Since
the total 1st floor area is 49,829-sq ft., the aggregate areas of the A-3 occupancies do not
occupy more than 10-percent (.10 X 49,829 = 4,983-sq ft. > 2,790-sq ft.) of the story they
occupy as stated in Section 508.2.1 of the 2015-IBC; they are thereby considered “accessory”
to the main occupancy.
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4.3. Occupancy Classification – LSC
Table 2 provides the classification of the occupancies within the building based upon Section
6.1 of the LSC:
Table 2. Building Occupancies per the LSC

Description of Use Occupancy

Occupancy Classification

Conference Room

Assembly

Office

Business

Storage

Storage

Lab and Clean Room

Business

Mechanical/Equipment Rooms

Industrial – General and
high hazard

4.4. Occupant Loads
A comparison of the occupant load factors from the IBC and LSC can be found in Table 3 below.
The occupant load factors were taken from LSC Table 7.3.1.2 and IBC Table 1004.1.2.
Table 3. Building Occupant Load Factors

Use

LSC Load Factor (ft2/person)

IBC Load Factor (ft2/person)

Assembly

15 net

15 net

Business

100

100

Industrial – General and high hazard

100

-

Storage

500

300

-

300

*Mechanical/Equipment Rooms

* The mechanical/equipment rooms are classified as “Industrial Use” for the LSC occupant load
factor.
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Based on Table 3 above, it is clear that the LSC offers more specific occupancy classifications for
the PF while keeping similar load factor requirements as the IBC. Storage use is the only
significant difference between the occupant load factors. Reference Appendix B for occupant
loads per floor tables.
4.5. Building Occupants
The majority of the occupants at the PF are engineers, scientists, and office staff members
who work in the building five days a week. High-school and college interns work in the
building year-round and especially in the summer. These interns can be less familiar with the
building and may be as young as sixteen. All PF occupants are able-bodied and capable of a
reasonable egress times. Visitors to the building may have physical disabilities that could
decrease their movement times, such as being wheelchair bound, however, there would only
be a very small number of individuals requiring increased movement time.
4.6. Building Characteristics
4.6.1. Description
This PF has three distinct wings (North, West, and East). The North Wing is two stories in height
with a basement, while the East and West Wings are one story each. The facility has a gross
area of 96,841 sq. ft.; it is 45-feet tall at its highest peak. The roof height of the single-story East
and West Wings is approximately 16-feet. The roof portion of the two-story portion of the
North Wing of the building has a height of approximately 35-feet, with the peak of the
Clerestory having a height of approximately 45-feet.
4.6.2. Construction Type
The allowable construction type(s) for the PF was determined by using Table 503 of the 2015IBC. The tallest wing is 2 stories with a basement and the overall facility has a gross area of
96,841 square-feet (18,691 for the basement, 49,829 for the first floor, and 28,321-sq ft. for the
second floor). The basement is located approximately 19-feet below the 1st floor grade. The
overall building height of the PF is 45-feet above the level of fire department vehicle access,
with the highest occupied floor being at approximately 25-foot above that level. Since the
highest occupied floor level is less than 75-feet, the building is not considered a high-rise per
Section 403 of the 2015-IBC.
The PF is situated on a level lot with all the sides of the building fronting on a public way or
open space having 20-feet minimum width. At SNL, multiple buildings are typically located on
the same lot (aka, Technical Area groupings) and therefore, the entire distance between
buildings or the public way width is permitted to be used according to Section 506.2.1 of the
2015-IBC. The weighted average of the widths of the public way or open space exceed 30-feet,
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therefore, a value of 30-feet is used as required by Section 506.2.1 of the 2015-IBC. The
frontage increase was calculated to be 75-percent as shown below:

𝐼𝐼𝑓𝑓 = �

1445
30
− 0.25� � � = 0.75 𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂 75%
1445
30

It’s worth mentioning that Unlimited (UL) Area buildings are permitted where the minimum
yard distance on all sides is 60-feet, and occupancy, sprinklers, and number of stories (max. of
2) meet the criteria in Section 507 of the 2015-IBC. A frontage increase factor of 1.5 is allowed
to be used for buildings that meet the aforementioned criteria. Due to construction at an
adjacent facility to the PF, not all of the public way measurements could be confirmed for this
facility, therefore this frontage increase factor was not used.
Since the PF is fully sprinklered in accordance with NFPA 13, then according to 504.2 of the
2015-IBC, the values specified in Table 503 for maximum building height can be increased by
20-ft and the maximum number of stories can be increased by one (1). These increases are
shown in Table 2.
The North Wing has a basement and in accordance with 506.4 of the 2015-IBC, the Exception
states in part that “a single basement need not be included in the total allowable building area,
provided such basement does not exceed the area permitted for a building with no more than
one story above grade plane.” The area of a single basement is not required to be counted as
part of the total building area when evaluating total allowable area in accordance with Section
506.4.1 of the 2015-IBC.
Table 4 below shows the types of construction that would be allowed with the aforementioned
automatic sprinkler and frontage increases; this table uses values from Table 503 of the 2015IBC. The PF basement area (18,691-sq ft.) is excluded from the total allowable building area
since it is less than any of the maximum area/story values calculated in Table 4. As shown, only
the Type V-B construction would not be allowed since the total allowable building area in Table
4 (67,500-sq ft.) is less than the aggregate gross square footage of the 1st and 2nd floors
(49,829 + 28,321 = 78,150-sq ft.) of the PF.
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Table 4. Types of Construction with Area, Height, Frontage and Sprinkler Area Increases

Added Fire
Protection
Features

Max Height
w/
Sprinklers

Max Stories
w/
Sprinklers

Max Story Area w/
Sprinklers &
Frontage Area

Total
Allowable
Bldg. Area

Const. Type

Equals
Max
Height+2

Equals
+1story

Aa={At+[At*If]+[At*Is]}

Aa*2

IA
IB
IIA
IIB
IIIA
IIIB
IV
V-A
V-B

UL
180
85
75
85
75
85
70
60

UL
12
6
4
6
4
6
4
3

UL
UL
86250
106875
71250
135000
67500
33750

UL
UL
28125
17250
21375
14250
27000
13500
6750

Acceptable

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

As shown in Table 4 above, the minimum construction permitted for the building is Type V-A,
however, design documents show that the PF was built as a Construction Type II-B building.
Record design documents show that the building was constructed as a Type II-B construction
(Type II-N per 1991 UBC code-of-record). Table 5 summarizes the height and area values for a
fully sprinklered Type II-B Group B occupancy
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Table 5. Height and Area Calculations

Requirements/Details

Values

Floor Area

Use Group B

Tabular Area per Story (Table 503)

23,000 square feet

Frontage Increase (Section 506.2)

17,250 square fee

Sprinkler Increase (Section 506.3)

46,000 square feet

Maximum Allowable Floor Area

86,250 square feet

Total Allowable Building Area

172,500 square feet

Building Height
Tabular Building Height (Table 503)

55 feet

Automatic Sprinkler System Increase
(Section 504.2)

20 feet

Total Building Height Allowed

75 feet

Actual Building Height

45 feet

Number of Stories
Tabular Building Height (Table 503)

3 stories

Automatic Sprinkler System Increase
(Section 504.2)

1 stories

Total Building Height Allowed

4 stories

Actual Building Height

2 stories plus a basement
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As shown in Tables 5 above, the PF is compliant with the maximum allowable building area,
building height and number of stories per 2015-IBC requirements for a Type II-B construction
building.
4.6.3. Building Use
The PF is used for research and light production that utilizes chemical, physics and electronic
laboratories and office support areas in order to support the laboratory mission. On average,
there are approximately 140 people (occupant load calculations allow up to 857 people)
occupying the entire building; these occupants are trained to be familiar with their work
hazards and are capable of self-preservation in the event of an emergency.
4.6.4. Occupancy Separations
The PF does not require fire-resistive protection for building elements except for those that are
part of a fire barrier. The North, East and West Wings are separated by 2-hour fire-resistive
construction barriers. Door opening protectives in these 2-hour walls were designed with a 90minute fire-resistance rating which is in compliance with Table 716.5 of the 2015-IBC.
The exit stair enclosures, single elevator shaft and multiple utility shafts are constructed as onehour fire resistive shafts as required for exit stair enclosures and shafts connecting less than
four (4) stories. Door assemblies in the required 1-hour-rated shafts, exit stair enclosures and
exit passageways have a fire resistance rating of 60-minutes per the code of record (i.e. –
Section 3309 of the 1991 UBC) as well as the current code requirements of the 2015-IBC. Door
assemblies in other 1-hour fire barriers (e.g. – control areas, electrical rooms) have a fireresistance rating of 45 minutes which is in compliance with Table 716.5 of the 2015-IBC.
Reference Appendix C which shows rated walls at the PF.
The typical fire-resistive wall construction was determined to be 5/8-inch Type “X” gypsum
board on metal studs in office and light laboratory areas. These walls were provided for several
reasons including NFPA 318, Section 708 of the 1991 UBC requirements for separation of
mechanical rooms. The clean rooms were constructed with one-hour fire-resistive separation in
accordance with the requirements in NFPA 318. Ceilings are suspended mineral tiles in the
office areas. Gypsum board ceilings were provided for the humidity room and main computer
rooms. All light laboratories and cleaning areas have non-shedding, noncombustible ceiling
tiles.
Section 707.5 of the 2015-IBC requires fire barriers to extend from the top of the foundation to
the underside of the floor or roof sheathing. Section 707.6 limits the size of an opening in the
fire barrier, however the PF is fully sprinklered and that allows the openings to not be limited to
156-sq ft. per Exception 1. Openings in the fire barrier shall be protected in accordance with
Section 716 and penetrations shall be protected in accordance with Section 714. Joints in the
fire barrier shall comply with Section 715. Section 603 of the 2015-IBC describes combustible
materials that are permitted to be used for caulking and sealing around joints, penetrations,
and openings in rated assemblies.
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Recent site surveys confirmed that sampled fire barriers and their associated penetrations,
were installed/protected in accordance with the aforementioned 2015-IBC requirements.
4.6.5. Communicating Space
The PF building contains a 2-story communicating space (aka, Atrium by current codes)
connecting the 1st and 2nd Floor levels. In accordance with the 2015-IBC, an “atrium” is defined
as an opening connecting two or more stories other than enclosed stairways, elevators, hoist
ways, escalators, plumbing, electrical, air-conditioning or other equipment, which is closed at
the top and not defined as a mall. Section 404.5 of the 2015-IBC Exception states that smoke
control is not required for atriums that connect only two stories. In accordance with Section
404.6 of the IBC (2015 Ed.) and Section 8.6.7 of NFPA 101 (2015 Ed.), atrium spaces shall be
separated from adjacent spaces by a 1-hour fire barrier. Figure 3 shows an interior view of the
communicating space looking up from the 1st floor level.

Figure 3 – Interior View of the Communicating Space

Previous editions of the building code, including the 1991 UBC (code-of-record), defined an
atrium as an opening connecting three or more stories, therefore the building did not have to
meet atrium requirements at the time of construction; this type of area was referred to as a
communicating space between floors. In accordance with Section 1706 and Table 17-A of the
1991 UBC, the communicating space was designed as an area for evacuation assistance with a
one-hour fire-resistance rating. Therefore, the one-hour fire resistive corridors that are part of
this atrium space, as well as the continuation of these corridors to the building exits, will be
maintained. This passive fire protection feature has been retained to comply with the
communicating space provisions of the 1991 UBC (code-of-record) and the current atrium
provisions of the 2015-IBC.
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4.6.6. Fire Resistance Ratings
Table 6 below, is a summary of the required fire resistance ratings and opening protection
requirements for the PF’s Type II-B construction in accordance with IBC-2015 Tables 601 and
602, unless otherwise noted:
Table 6. Building Elements

Building Element

Required Fire
Resistance Rating

Provided/Actual Fire
Resistance Rating

Structural Frame (beams and columns)

0 Hours

0 Hours

Bearing Walls (exterior)

0 Hours

0 Hours

Bearing Walls (interior)

0 Hours

0 Hours

* Nonbearing Walls (exterior)

0 Hours

0 Hours

Not required

Not required

Nonbearing Walls and Partitions (interior)

0 Hours

0 Hours

Floor Construction

0 Hours

0 Hours

Roof Construction

0 Hours

0 Hours

*Unprotected Openings (IBC Section 705.8)

* The PF is fully sprinklered and has a fire separation distance of greater than 30-feet on all
sides; therefore the exterior nonbearing walls do not require a rating in accordance with
Section 705.8 and Table 705.8 of the IBC.
As previously mentioned, the North, East and West Wings of the PF are separated by 2-hour
fire-resistive construction barriers. Door opening protectives in these 2-hour walls were
designed with 90-minute fire resistance ratings.
4.6.7. Interior Finish
Table 7 outlines the required interior wall and ceiling finish requirements in accordance with
2015-IBC for a sprinklered Group B occupancy.
The PF record documents state that all interior finish materials are UL-listed for a flame spread
index rating of 25 or less and a smoke developed index rating of less than 50.
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Table 7. Wall and Ceiling Finish

Component

Minimum
Required
Classification

Provided
Classification*

Flame
Spread
Index

Smoke
Development
Index

Exit
Enclosures/Passageway

B

I

0-25

0-450

Corridors

C

II

26-75

0-450

Rooms/Enclosed Spaces

C

III

76-200

0-450

*The provided classification designations are based off Tables 42-A and 42-B of the 1991-UBC
(code-of-record) for a Group B occupancy.
The floor finishes for the PF include carpet tile in the office areas, vinyl tile in corridors, and
sealed concrete in light laboratories and storage areas. The PF has code compliant wall and
ceiling finishes throughout.
4.6.8. Summary
The PF’s occupancy and building characteristics meet all the requirements of the current codes
and standards and help limit potential damages from a fire. The minimum construction type for
the PF was determined to be a Type V-A, however the building was constructed as a Type II-B
which is a more robust construction type. Since this building is fully sprinklered and has a fire
separation distance of at least 30-ft on all sides, the exterior nonbearing walls do not require a
rating. The interior finishes specified are also acceptable, however the use of rooms and areas
can change and will need to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis when missions change.
An important step in developing the life safety design of a building is the design of a code
compliant egress system. The next section in this report reviews and discusses the means of
egress components and their design for the PF.
4.7. Means of Egress
4.7.1. Introduction
Means of egress components are required to comply with the provisions of Chapter 10 of the
IBC and Chapter 7 of the LSC. The components addressed in this section include the number of
exits, exit capacity calculations, arrangement of the means of egress, horizontal exits, and exit
signs. Figure 4 below shows the PF main hallway on the first floor looking south.
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Figure 4 – Main Hallway on 1 Floor

4.7.2. Number of Exits
The number of required exits depends on the occupant load. Since none of the floors have an
occupant load of more than 500, two exits per floor is sufficient, as stated in the LSC 7.4.1.1 and
7.4.1.2.
The first floor of the PF has twenty-three (23) exits leading directly to the exterior of the
building. Thirteen (13) of these exits are located in areas that are not available to all of the
building occupants. The basement is served by two stairs; one stair is dedicated to the
basement and the other provides access to all the floors. The exits are remotely located from
each other, as directed by LSC 7.5.1.3.1. Reference Appendix D for all exit locations for the PF.
4.7.3. Exit Capacity Calculations
Egress capacity for the PF exits is prescribed in the LSC Table 7.3.3.1. for non-healthcare
facilities, stairways are permitted to have 0.3 inches/person and level components can have
0.2 inches/person. Level components include doorways into the stairwell and outside
discharge. To calculate whether or not the PF meets the prescriptive-based requirements, it
is assumed that the occupant load is divided evenly amongst all exits. The exit capacity has
to be greater than the occupant load of the floor divided by the number of exits.
Reference Appendix E for the egress analysis calculations. As shown in the table in Appendix E,
the four stairs are the most restrictive components of all the egress systems. Therefore, the
total calculated stairwell exit capacity for the PF is 605 people. The total building occupant load
is 857 people and of that amount, 412 people can be deducted from the total since they would
be exiting directly from any one of the twenty-three exits on the 1st floor. This would leave a
total of 445 people using the stairwells which is less than the calculated capacity of 605
people. Based on the aforementioned information, the exit capacity is able to support the
occupant load of the PF.
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4.7.4. Total Building Evacuation Times – Hand Calculations
A hydraulic flow model from Chapter 13, Section 3 of the SFPE Handbook was used to estimate
the total evacuation time for PF. The hydraulic model relies on the following assumptions:
All persons start to evacuate at the same time and travel time to the stairways/doorways is not
analyzed.
• Occupant flow does not involve interruptions caused by evacuee decisions.
• The evacuees are free of impairments/disabilities that impede their movement.
• The flow through doorways and stairways was always maximized.
• The occupant load was distributed equally between exits. The required safe egress time
(RSET) is equal to the sum of discrete time intervals, given by the equation:
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑 + 𝑡𝑡𝑛𝑛 + 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝−𝑒𝑒 + 𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒

Where:
td = Time from fire ignition to detection (will be combined with tn in performance based section
of this report)
tn= Time from detection to notification of occupants (will be combined with td in performance
based section of this report)
t p-e=Pre-evacuation (aka Pre-movement time)
te = Time from start of purposive evacuation movement until safety is reached
The first step is to find the effective width of the stairway. The boundary layer for stairways,
according to Table 3-13.1 in the SFPE Handbook, is 6” on each side, meaning there will be an
effective width of 12” for each stairway. The stairs have a maximum specific flow of 18.5
persons/min/ft. (7/11 riser/tread), according to Table 3-13.5 in the SFPE Handbook. Based on
these constants, the flow rate for the NE, NW, West, and South stairs are as follows:

𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = (62"-12") ∗ (1𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓/12") ∗ �
𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = (61"-12") ∗ (1𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓/12") ∗ �

18.5

18.5

𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = (61"-12") ∗ (1𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓/12") ∗ �

𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 � = 77 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝/𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓

𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 � = 75 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝/𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓

18.5

𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝
𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 � = 75 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝/𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓
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𝐹𝐹𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 = (46"-12") ∗ (1𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓/12") ∗ �

18.5

𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 � = 52 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝/𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓

The doors leading into and out of the stairways will be analyzed next. Since there is a bar
between the doors, the effective widths will double, thus the doors will have an effective width
of 24”. Doors and corridors have a maximum specific flow of 24 persons/min/ft., according to
the same source. Based on these constants, the flow rate for the doors are:
𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆_𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = (72" − 24") ∗ �

24

𝐹𝐹𝑁𝑁𝑊𝑊𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆_𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = (72" − 24") ∗ �
𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆ℎ

𝐹𝐹𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆_𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷

𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆_𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷

24

= (72" − 24") ∗ �

= (44" − 12") ∗ �

𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 � ∗ (1𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓/12") = 96 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝/𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 � ∗ (1𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓/12") = 96 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝/𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓

24

24

𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 � ∗ (1𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓/12") = 96 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝/𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓

𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 � ∗ (1𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓/12") = 64 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝/𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓

The flow rate for the three stairs from the 2nd floor is limited by the maximum specific flow for
the stairways. The time to evacuate from the 2nd floor is based on the occupant load
determined earlier in the report and is shown below:
𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 −2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =

(315 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝/3)
= 1.3 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
77 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝/𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚

𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁/𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆ℎ_𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 2𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 =

(315 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝/3)
= 1.4 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
75 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝/𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚

𝑡𝑡𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁/𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹−𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 =

(130 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝/2)
= 1.25 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
52 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝/𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
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Since the time to evacuate the basement stairs is less than the time it would take to evacuate
the stairs for the 2nd floor, it does not need to be included in the overall evacuation. Another
factor that was analyzed was whether the doors would be a limiting factor with people coming
from the 2nd floor and the basement. The exiting time is equal to 1.4 minutes (NW/South 2nd
floor stairs). The time it would take an occupant to get from the second floor to the first floor
must be evaluated. The 1.4 minutes accounts for once the stairway starts queuing however, it
takes time to get from the second floor to the first floor, as described in the SFPE Handbook.
The speed of movement down the stairs would equal:
S = k – akD = 212 - 2.86 * 212 * 0.175 = 106 ft/minute
The constants for stairs were found on page 3-379 in the SFPE Handbook. With this velocity, the
travel time can be calculated since the travel distance between floors is around 38.2 ft. Thus,
the travel time for an occupant moving from the second floor to the first would equal:
𝑡𝑡2 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 1 =

38.2𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓
= 0.36 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚
106 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓/𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚

Returning to the RSET equation: td + tn + tp-e + te, the total building evacuation time can be
calculated as shown in Table 8 below.
Table 8. Total Building Evacuation Time
Egress Equation Times

Production Facility Details

Time

Detection Time

The detection time is minimal during occupied hours (when
occupants are alert and walking around). During unoccupied
hours, smoke detectors are around the building so this time
will still be minimal.

31 s

Alarm Time

If an occupant smells smoke or sees flames, there are pull
stations at every exit. If a smoke detector alarms, the fire
alarm will sound for the whole building.

0s

Pre-movement Time:
Recognition &
Response Times

This value is determined in the performance-based section of
this report (Section 11.12.4). Fire Drills occur on an annual
basis and false alarms are infrequent, thus the recognition
time is minimal. PF will have a smaller response time than a
building with visitors who don’t know the building or require
extra assistance.

36 s

Movement Time

Corridors have emergency lighting and exits are clearly
marked with exit signs, so this time will again be minimal.

= 0.36min + 1.4 min =
1.76 min (106s)

RSET = 31s + 36s + 106s = 173s = 2.9 minutes
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According to the aforementioned hydraulic model values, the estimated time for evacuation of
the entire building is approximately 2.9 minutes. However, one must consider that the values
from detection time, alarm time, and pre-movement time are all estimates and can vary
depending on the particular situation. In addition, travel time from a location on the floor to
the exit stairway (on the 2nd floor and the basement) is not taken into account which would add
more time. A safety factor was not added to the calculated RSET value above since the premovement time value is conservative based upon annual fire drills and infrequent false alarms
at the PF. In conclusion, this is an optimal evacuation time for PF. The Pathfinder and FDS
simulated evacuation times are provided in the following Section and Section 11.12.6 of this
report.
4.7.5. Total Building Time – Computer Modeling (Pathfinder)
A computer model using Thunderhead Engineering’s Pathfinder 2015 ® was generated to
replicate evacuations at the PF. Pathfinder is an emergency egress simulator that allows the
user to evaluate evacuation models. The basement, first, and second floor plans were imported
into Pathfinder and rooms, stairways and doors were drawn manually. The second floor has a
calculated occupant load of 315 people and the first floor has 412 occupants. These people
have egress access from 13 to 23 exits that lead directly to the outside of the building. See
Appendix H for Pathfinder screenshots and model egress time. There were some minor
differences between the model and the actual building setup, a few of which are noted below:
• Only one egress door was modeled for lab rooms although all the lab rooms have two
doors; however, in Pathfinder users would go through the lab to egress, which would not
happen in real life. Therefore, less doors were added but that also created queues in rooms
for people regressing.
• There are significantly less people occupying the building, so the long queue lines would not
exist if an actual evacuation occurred based on the average number of people in the
building (i.e., 140 people).
• Pre-movement times, detection and alarm times were not accounted for in the model.
• The areas were modeled as empty rooms and furniture will affect occupants’ egress
time.
The Pathfinder ® model predicted a total building evacuation time of 144 seconds (2.4
minutes) as shown in Appendix H. The Pathfinder evacuation time value compares nicely
with the aforementioned hydraulic model value which estimated a total building evacuation
time of 2.9 minutes.
4.7.6. Arrangement of the Means of Egress
4.7.6.1. Remoteness of Exits
Since the PF is protected throughout by an approved automatic sprinkler system, the
minimum separation distance between two remote exits must be greater than one-third the
length of the maximum overall diagonal dimension of the building, according to the LSC
7.5.1.3.3. The diagonal measured on the first floor (the greatest area) is equal to 330-ft, with
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1/3 the diagonal equaling 110-ft. The closest main exits are 135-ft apart, thus greater than the
minimum distance. The PF is compliant in regards to the arrangement of its exits.
4.7.6.2. Dead-Ends
The maximum dead-end distance allowed is 50-ft for both the LSC 7.5.1.5 and IBC 1020.4. There
are no areas in the PF that exceed these dead-end distance requirements of the LSC and IBC.
4.7.6.3. Common Path of Travel
The maximum common path of travel allowed by the LSC Section 7.6 and IBC 1006.2.1 is 100-ft.
There are no areas in the PF that exceed the maximum common path of travel distance
requirements of the LSC and IBC. 4.7.6.4. Table 9 below shows the travel distance requirements
taken from IBC Table 1017.2 and LSC Table A.7.6. All travel distance values are based upon an
existing fully sprinklered building.
Table 9. Travel Distances (ft)

Occupancy

LSC

IBC

Actual

Business/B

300

300

163

Assembly/A-3

250

250

132

250

87

No Requirement

-

Industrial – General 250
and high hazard
Storage – Low Hazard No Requirement

Travel distances were measured from the furthest point within occupancy to the nearest exit.
All travel distances within the PF comply with IBC and LSC requirements.
4.7.7. Horizontal Exits
There are no horizontal exits at the PF.
4.8. Exit Signs
Exit signs are required in the building in accordance with the IBC Section 1013.1 and LSC Section
7.10. Exit signs are required to be illuminated and readily visible. Refer to Appendix F for exit
sign location drawings. The PF is in compliance with exit sign code requirements for both the
LSC and IBC. Figure 5 below shows an example of a typical exit sign at the PF.
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Figure 5 – Example of Exit Sign Location at Main Exit (North)

4.9. Summary
The arrangement, remoteness, and the number of exits for each level is acceptable. The exit
capacity for each exit was determined to be greater than the occupant loads. The hydraulic
model building evacuation time compared nicely to the Pathfinder simulated time. The building
does not have any dead-ends and the maximum common path and travel distances were found
to not exceed the code mandated values. Exit signs were determined to be in compliance with
code requirements.
The activation of the fire suppression system will initiate egress from the building. The next
section of this report discusses the design and operation of the fire suppression system.

5. Fire Suppression System
5.1. Water Tanks and Fire Hydrants
Kirtland Air Force Base (KAFB) has three main water tanks supporting fire suppression systems.
The tank sizes are 750,000 and two 500,000 gallons. The PF is located in Tech Area I of Sandia
National Laboratories which is the area of the Sandia campus which has the most developed
water line system because of the high number of facilities in the area and population of building
occupants. There are numerous fire hydrants installed around the PF as shown in Figure 6
below. NFPA 24 paragraph 7.2.1 states that hydrants shall be provided and spaced in
accordance with the requirement s of the authority having jurisdiction. SNL uses a minimum
distance of 100’ to the FDC, and other hydrants being located within 300’ of any location in the
building.
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Figure 6 – Fire Hydrant Locations

5.2. Water Supply Analysis
The water supply supply and demand graph for the worst-case fire sprinkler demands is shown
in Figure 7 below. The sprinkler systems were hydraulically designed to provide a density in
accordance with ordinary hazard, Group 2 criteria. A minimum 500-gpm hose stream allowance
has been included with the sprinkler flow demand in the design of all systems in the building
(DOE Requirement). The graph clearly shows that the water supply is greater than the sprinkler
system demand and is sufficient to provide ample water supply in case of a fire.
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Figure 7 – Water Supply Graph Using Worst Case Sprinkler Demands

Page | 23

5.3. Automatic Sprinkler Protection
Automatic sprinkler protection is provided for the entire PF complex. It consists of an
ordinary hazard system (DOE requirement) on maximum 130-ft2 spacing per sprinkler with 165F
1/2-inch orifice sprinklers fed by a 6-inch wet-pipe valve. The sprinkler systems were
hydraulically designed to provide a density in accordance with Ordinary Hazard, Group 2
criteria. A minimum 500-gpm hose stream allowance (DOE requirement) has been included
with the sprinkler flow demand in the design of all systems in the building. Due to the need for
functional independence between the East Wing prototyping area and the North Wing
fabrication area, a separate riser and lead-in has been provided for the East Wing and
North/West Wings. A new 8-inch lead-in was provided from the underground main to the riser
for the East Wing. A post indicator valve (PIV) was provided for isolation of the lead-in, located
approximately 25-ft south of the building to allow safe access in the event of a fire. A 4-inch
freestanding fire department connection was provided south of the building. Figures 8 and 9
below show the PIV and Fire Department Connection (FDC) for the 8-inch lead in.

Figure 8 –Post Indicator Valve and FDC

Figure 9 – West Wing Riser

Sprinkler protection for the clean rooms, Final Assembly/Deposition/ Particulate Contaminate
Control Area, Metalize Area, Cleaning Rooms, Inspection Room, Receiving and Inventory,
Encapsulation and Development, Tube Testing, Chemical Technology and Metallurgy, and
Furnace Area were hydraulically designed to provide a minimum density of 0.20-gpm/ft2 over
the most remote 3000-ft2 using quick response pendant type sprinklers with a low-temperature
rating (135F to 170F). All sprinklers are spaced on maximum 100-ft2 spacing.
The Administrative Offices of the West Wing, Computer Room, and second floor Office and
Conference Rooms protected by this system is capable of providing a minimum density of 0.18
gpm/ft2 over the most remote 2,500 ft2 utilizing standard sprinklers on a maximum 130-ft2
/sprinkler spacing.
Sprinkler protection for the Clean Room, Hooded Room, Assembly Area, Metalize Area,
Cleaning Room, Inspection Room, and Furnace Area were hydraulically designed to provide a
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minimum density of 0.20 gpm/ft2 over the most remote 3000 ft2 using quick response pendant
type sprinklers with a temperature rating of 135°F to 170°F. All sprinklers are on a maximum
100 ft2 per sprinkler spacing.
The Mechanical/Electrical Room has high temperature (286°F) sprinklers on a maximum 100 ft2
per sprinkler spacing and was hydraulically designed for a minimum density of 0.20 gpm/ft2
over the entire room area. Remaining portions of the East Wing protected by this system are
capable of a minimum density of 0.15 gpm/ft2 over the most remote 2,500 ft2 utilizing standard
temperature rated sprinklers on a maximum 130 ft2 per sprinklerspacing. Automatic sprinkler
protection is also provided in the Bunker using a wet-pipe arrangement with high-temperature
rated sprinklers capable of a minimum density of 0.60 gpm/ft2 over the entire respective
building area. Hydraulic calculations for one of the most remote area of the second floor are
located in Appendix H of this report.
Automatic sprinklers used within the facility are primarily Tyco/Grinnell Model TY-L Series, ½ in.
orifice, and ordinary temperature sprinklers. Within the cleanrooms Central Omega Model C-1
sprinklers were used and they were replaced as part of the recall for that particular sprinkler.
Some of the cleanrooms within Bldg. 870 had ordinary-response, automatic sprinklers. Due to
the high air velocities within the cleanrooms, quick response sprinklers are required and were
installed in some areas in order to respond to a fire within an adequate time frame. A full set of
sprinkler drawings are located in Appendix G of this report.
Based on the review of the fire sprinkler drawings, the PF is NFPA 13 code compliant with the
location of fire sprinkler devices. The PF has a fire protection assessment conducted every three
(3) years and there are no major open findings for deficiencies related to the fire sprinkler
design and installation. Sprinkler device cut-sheets are provided in Appendix H.
5.4. Fire Fighting Systems
The facility is provided with Class I standpipes in the stairwells. These standpipes are classified
as manual standpipes, since the available water supply will not provide 100 psi at the top of the
riser. Portable fire extinguishers of the proper type and size are properly located throughout
the building. There are three hydrants located near this structure. One is approximately 25-ft
south, the second is approximately 42-ft north, and the third is approximately 55-ft west of the
building. These three hydrants will adequately cover all areas of this building; therefore,
additional fire hydrants for this facility are not required to meet the 300-ft spacing
requirement.
5.5. Sprinkler System Hydraulic Calculations
There are no existing hydraulic design calculations available for the PF. The sample hydraulic
calculation performed is assumed to be one of the most hydraulically demanding scenarios for
the facility. It assumes that the area protected by riser #1 is on fire. The size of the remote area
is 1500 sq.ft. And the design density is 0.20 gpm/ft2. Figure 10 illustrates the area and the
sprinkler piping network.
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Figure 10 – Hydraulically Remote Area – 2nd Floor

5.6. Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance
Inspection, Testing and Maintenance is performed in accordance with NFPA 25. The frequency
of inspections and testing can be found in Section 8 of this report.
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5.7. Summary
The PF is located in an area of the laboratory that has the most developed water line system.
There are also numerous fire hydrants installed around the building. The water supply serving
the building was tested and found to be able to provide more than the building’s sprinkler
system demand and is therefore deemed more than adequate for fire suppression purposes.
There are some noted deficiencies such as no existing hydraulic sprinkler system calculations,
current drawings, and updated waterflow test documents. A waterflow test has been scheduled
in the nearterm and the other deficiencies will be corrected as scheduling permits.
The fire sprinkler system for the PF is robust and will provide a sufficient amount of water to
suppress most anticipated fires in the building. The next section of this report discusses the
design and operation of the fire alarm system.

6. Fire Alarm System
6.1. General Description
The building’s fire alarm system is monitored by a proprietary supervising station. The station is
located on Kirtland Air Force Base (KAFB) and monitors all of the SNL Albuquerque location. The
station utilizes a Digital Alarm Communicator Receiver (DACR) to receive alarms from Digital
Alarm Communicator Transmitters (DACT) located inside the fire alarm control panel (FACP).
The FACP is an Edwards Signaling Technology (EST) Quick Start (QS4) Intelligent Control Panel.
The panel can support up to 1,000 intelligent detectors and modules along with 48
conventional Class B or 40 Class A/B initiating device circuits (IDC). Appendix I includes all the
fire alarm equipment/device manufacturer datasheets. The FACP and Power Expander Panels
are shown in Figure 11 below.

Figure 11 – FACP and Power Expander Panels
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6.2. Operating Characteristics
All fire alarm, trouble, and supervisory signals are directed to the FACP which has a radio
transponder that transmits them to Sandia’s proprietary receiving system; they are then
retransmitted to the Kirtland AFB Fire Department for their disposition and subsequent
response, as necessary, in accordance with NFPA 72, 26.4.6.6. Figure 12 below shows the
Fire Alarm System Functional Matrix.

Figure 12–Fire Alarm System Functional Matrix

6.3. Types of Devices
Fire detection devices on a Signaling Line Circuit (SLC) or IDC shall be an NFPA 72 Class A circuit
per Sandia Spec. 13852 Sect. 1.06. According to NFPA 72, 12.3.1, a Class A pathway includes a
redundant path, continues to operate past a single open or a single ground fault, and conditions
that affect the intended path result in a trouble signal. Figure 13 below shows some of the
typical fire detection and initiating devices found at the PF.

Page | 28

Figure 13 – Fire Alarm Detection and Initiating Devices

The PF contains various forms of fire detection devices throughout the building. There is not a
full smoke detection coverage requirement for the building per IBC 907.2 and NFPA 72,
17.5.3.2. Smoke/Duct detectors exist to specific areas to activate a fire alarm safety function
per IBC 907.3. These fire alarm safety functions include controlling door releases, shutting
down the HVAC (smoke-control function), shutting down toxic gas panel. Smoke detectors are
also located to protect the FACP and FATCs per IBC 907.4.1 and NFPA 72, 10.4.4. Duct detectors
are located in the supply and return air ducts for unit shutdown (i.e., smoke control), and
vanetype water flow detectors are located n the sprinkler risers. Heat detectors or specialty
harsh environment smoke detectors are used instead of the photoelectric smoke detectors in
areas that are smoky, dusty, humid, or have extreme temperatures. A High-Sensitivity Smoke
Detection (HSSD) system is also located in clean room areas. Manual pull stations are located
every 400-feet in the corridor, and every 150-feet along the chemical transport route per IBC
415.10.2. Manual pull stations are located near every exit of the building even though IBC 907.2
only requires a minimum of one pull station. The pull stations are located within 5 feet of every
exit per IBC 907.4.2.1. Manual pull stations are installed 42-48 inches above the finished floor
per IBC 907.4.2.2. Table 10 below provides a detailed list of the fire alarm initiating devices
installed at the PF.
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Table 10. Fire Alarm Initiating Devices
Initiating Devices
Manufacturer

Locations

Number

Duct
Detector

ESTSIGA-SD
Signature
Series
Super
Duct

Return air, supply air

16

Flow
Switches

EST Dual
Monitor
Module

Riser Rooms

1

Heat
Detector

ESTSIGAHRS, Heat
Detector

Elevator pits, elevator
mechanical rooms and top
of elevator shaft

45

Pressure
Switches

EST Dual
Monitor
Module

One for each riser

3

Alarm

Pull Station

ESTSIGA-278
Pull Station

37

Alarm

Smoke
Detector

ESTSIGA-PS
Smoke
Det.

Sprinkler
Supervisory
(Tampers)

EST Dual
Monitor
Module

Next to all exits, next to
all entrances to
stairways
Elevator lobbies and
shafts, unoccupied
telecom rooms, lunch
rooms and by FACP
Two on each floor for each
control valve and in
chemicals to rage area for
Anti freeze loop

87

8

Specifications

Supervisory or
Alarm?

Device

0.79%to2.46%
obscuration/ft.

Supervisory

Alarm

Alarm sat
135˚F(57˚C)orRORof15˚F/
min(9.4˚C)

0.67% to3.77%/ft.

Alarm

Alarm

Supervisory

6.4. Location, Spacing, and Placement of Devices
The PF FACP and specific locations for the fire alarm devices can be found in Appendix J - Fire
Alarm Shop Drawings. The PF is in full code compliance regarding the installation and
placement of fire alarm initiating devices. See below for a partial list of code requirements for
device placement:
•
•

IBC 2015 Section 404.4 – Fire Alarm System. A fire alarm system shall be provided in
accordance with Section 907.2.14 and the PF meets this requirement.
IBC 2015 Section 907.4.1 – Protection of Fire Alarm Control Unit. In areas not
continuously occupied, a single smoke detector shall be provided at the location of each
fire alarm control unit, notification appliance circuit power extenders, and supervising
station transmitting equipment. The PF meets this requirement. A smoke detector is
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•
•

•

•

provided in each one of these areas. (Note: Duct smoke detectors are also installed where
required by NFPA 90A.).
IBC 2015 Section 907.4.2.1 – Location. Manual fire alarm boxes shall be located not more
than 5 feet from the entrance to the exit. The PF meets this requirement. The PF has 37 pull
stations in required locations. (Note: NFPA 101 9.6.2.3 has the same requirement.)
NFPA 101 Paragraph 9.6.2.5 – Additional fire alarm boxes shall be located so that, on any
given floor in any part of the building, no horizontal distance on that floor exceeding 200 ft
shall need to be traversed to reach a manual fire alarm box. The PF meets this requirement
upon review.
NFPA 101 Paragraph 9.6.2.8 – Where a sprinkler system is installed, an automatic detection
and alarm system initiation input shall be provided that operates when the flow of water is
equal or greater than that form a single automatic sprinkler. Each of the three risers in the
PF has water flow/pressure switches with monitor modules which are connected to the fire
alarm system. Upon any water flow condition, the fire alarm system sounds a general fire
alarm throughout the facility.
NFPA 72 Chapter 18 spacing requirements for smoke and heat detectors: PF meets code

6.5. Fire Alarm Signal Disposition
The fire alarm system at the PF communicates to a proprietary supervising station at Sandia
National Laboratories. The reason this station, called The Phoenix, is this type is that it is
monitored by Sandia emergency operations, maintenance and fire protection engineering all of
who have a financial stake (from a company perspective in the protected property (buildings).
The central station is monitored by a workstation in Sandia’s maintenance building. The
manager of the Fire Protection maintenance department also has a monitor in his office that he
watches throughout the day. Finally, the Kirtland Air Force Department receives the signals
from The Phoenix at their Honeywell central receiving station. There is no Emergency
communication system installed for the PF.
If an alarm is received at the PF or any other Sandia building, then the Kirtland Air Force Base
Fire Department will respond to the building and extinguish the fire as appropriate. If a trouble
is received at the supervising station, then the fire protection maintenance manager will
dispatch personnel to troubleshoot the system. If a supervisory signal is received then Sandia
emergency operations will investigate and contact Sandia facilities if need-be. In the event of an
alarm at the PF, key management personnel will also be notified and coordinated with to avoid
shutting down production or evacuating personnel if need-be.
6.6. Types of Alarm Notification Appliances
The standard notification appliance located throughout the PF is a Wheelock series wall
horn/multi-candela setting strobe appliances. There are some variations to this depending on
where they are located. In the clean rooms, audible only devices are installed as not to interfere
with the manufacturing process (which a strobe would do with its “harsh” light). Figure 14
shows a typical notification device for the PF. There are a couple strobe only devices located in
the facility as well. Table 11 below provides a detailed list of the fire alarm notification devices
installed at the PF.
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Table 11. Fire Alarm Notification Devices
Fire Alarm Notification Devices
Device

Manufacturer

Locations

Number

Specifications

Multitone
Horn/ Strobe

Wheelock MT24MCW

Throughout the building as required to achieve
the proper coverage.

75

Varies, initially
set to 15cd

Strobe

Wheelock RSS24MCW-FR
multi- candela
strobe

All common areas (e.g. restrooms, conference
rooms,
break areas, corridors, hallways, stairways,
lobbies), open areas with calculated occupant
loads
of 10 or more occupants, and in locations with a
high ambient sound level (e.g. mechanical
rooms)

27

Varies, initially
set to 15cd

Exterior
Strobe

System Sensor
SpectrAlert
Advance,
Model SRHKR,
weatherproof

At main entrance of the building that is readily
visible to emergency responders for indicating
when the building fire alarm system is in
ALARM condition

1

Set to 75cd

Figure 14– Fire Alarm Notification Device
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6.7. Location, Spacing, and Placement of Devices
Most of the occupied areas of the facility have coverage with a notification appliance. NFPA 72
makes it clear that it doesn’t dictate exactly where an appliance is located for audible and visual
notification purposes. See the relevant NFPA 72 excerpts below:
•
•

•

•
•
•

18.4.1.4.1 The designer of the audible notification system shall identify the rooms and
spaces that will have audible notification and those where audible notification will not be
provided.
18.4.1.4.2 Unless otherwise specified or required by other sections of this Code, the
required coverage area for visible occupant notification shall be as required by other
governing
laws,
code, or standards. Where the other governing laws, codes, or standards require audible
occupant notification for all or part of an area or space, coverage shall only be required in
occupiable areas as defined in 3.3.178.
18.4.1.4.3 The sound pressure levels that must be produced by the audible appliances in
the coverage areas to meet the requirements of this Code shall be documented by the
system
designer during the planning and design of the notification system. The greater of the
expected maximum sound pressure level having duration of at least 60 seconds shall also be
documented for the coverage area by the system designed to ensure compliance with
18.4.3, 18.4.4, 18.4.5, or 18.4.6 for the coverage area.
3.3.178 Occupiable Area. An area of a facility occupied by people on a regular basis.
18.5.2.1 The designer of the visible notification system shall document the rooms and
spaces that will have visible notification and those where visible notification will not be
provided.
18.5.2.2 Unless otherwise specified or required by other sections of this Code, the required
coverage area for visible occupant notification shall be as required by other governing laws,
code, or standards.

Based on the review of the fire alarm drawings, the PF is NFPA 72 code compliant with the
location of notification appliances. Sandia National Laboratories does not require individual
audible or visual notification appliances in individual offices. It also does not require them in
storage rooms. Sandia requires notification appliances (both visual and audible) in conference
rooms. Acceptance testing was performed for the facility and it was documented that the
sound pressure levels of the appliances did not exceed 110dBA (per NFPA 72 18.4.1.2) and that
they were at least 15dBA above any commonly accepted values of ambient noise levels
throughout the facility (for business space, lab space, etc.). NFPA 72 paragraphs 18.4.8.1,
18.5.5.1, and 18.5.5.2 cover the mounting installation requirements for notification appliances.
One of these requirements is to install wall mounted notification appliances such that entire
lens is not less than 80 in. and not greater than 96 in. above the finished floor. The PF has a fire
protection assessment every three years and there are currently no open findings for any
deficiencies related to the fire alarm design and installation.

Page | 33

6.8. Secondary Power
Secondary power is provided for the PF fire alarm system via batteries located below the panel.
Batteries are also provided for the Power Supply Panels. The design of the batteries follows the
requirements in NFPA 72 paragraph 10.6.7.2.1 which states the secondary power supply must
have the power capacity for 24 hours of standby operation and 5 minutes of operation in alarm
mode Sandia uses lead-acid type batteries and has them routinely replaced by the fire alarm
maintenance crew if the battery is more than 4 years old.
6.8.1. Adequacy of Secondary Power
The quantity of devices and NACs in the PF was extrapolated from the Sandia database and
contract drawings. Manufacturer cut sheets were used to determine the required secondary
power requirements. Using the requirements of NFPA 72 10.6.7.2.1, the calculated required
amp-hours (AH) of the secondary power supply is 10-AH for the main FACP. The provided
secondary supply capacity for the PF FACP is 12-AH, therefore the secondary power is
adequate. The aforementioned battery supply requirements include a safety factor. The results
of the battery supply calculations for the FACP and the four Power Supply Panels as well as
voltage drops are provided in Appendix K of this report.
6.9. Smoke Control
The building contains a 2-story communicating space (aka, Atrium by current codes) connecting
the 1st and 2nd Floor levels. In accordance with the 2015-IBC, an “atrium” is defined as an
opening connecting two or more stories other than enclosed stairways, elevators, hoist ways,
escalators, plumbing, electrical, air-conditioning or other equipment, which is closed at the top
and not defined as a mall. Section 404.5 of the 2015-IBC Exception states that smoke control is
not required for atriums that connect only two stories. In accordance with Section 404.6 of the
IBC (2015 Ed.) and Section 8.6.7 of NFPA 101 (2015 Ed.), atrium spaces shall be separated from
adjacent spaces by a 1-hour fire barrier.
Previous editions of the building code, including the 1991 UBC (code-of-record), defined an
atrium as an opening connecting three or more stories, therefore the building did not have to
meet atrium requirements at the time of construction; this type of area was referred to as a
communicating space between floors. In accordance with Section 1706 and Table 17-A of the
1991 UBC, the communicating space was designed as an area for evacuation assistance with a
one-hour fire-resistance rating. Therefore, the one-hour fire resistive corridors that are part of
this atrium space, as well as the continuation of these corridors to the building exits, will be
maintained. This passive fire protection feature has been retained to comply with the
communicating space provisions of the 1991 UBC (code-of-record) and the current atrium
provisions of the 2015-IBC.
Smoke movement into other areas of the building is controlled by HVAC duct-mounted smoke
detectors and their interlocking damper closure and unit shutdown upon sensing smoke. The
intent of this action is to control and/or limit the amount of smoke spread into other parts of
the building.
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6.10. Summary
The building’s fire alarm system has been designed and installed per NFPA 72, the LSC, and IBC
requirements. The fire alarm system has both manual and automatic devices installed. The
alarm notification system consisted of horn or horn/strobe type devices.
The next section of this report discusses the structural fire protection systems for the PF.

7. Structural Analysis
7.1. Structural Fire Protection
The primary steel structure for the PF consists of steel wide-flange columns supporting steel
wide-flange girders, beams, and joists. Only a small percentage of the primary steel structure is
protected by spray applied fire-resistive material (SFRM); the SFRM is not a requirement since
this building is classified as Type II-B noncombustible construction. Structural drawings are
provided in Appendix L of this report. Building construction elements for the PF consist of a
concrete slab on grade foundation and non-protected steel frame superstructure. Exterior walls
at the East and West Wings are coated with 4-in. thick isocyanine form exterior mounted
insulation covered by ¼-in. thick cementicious stucco covering. The roof assemblies of the
facility are constructed of a single-ply membrane system over rigid insulation supported by a
metal deck with an FM Type I-90 wind uplift rating and a 20-psf design live load. Additional
design loads are shown in Figure 15. Roof framing members are sloped to provide positive
drainage. The roof assembly is Class II insulated metal deck supported by unprotected steel
beams and trusses.

Figure 15 – Structural Design Loads from Record Drawings
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The building floor for the East and West Wings is a reinforced 5-in. concrete slab on grade. The
floor of the North Wing is a reinforced 5-in. concrete floor slab. Record drawings show that the
floor/ceiling assemblies in the basement area were intended to be constructed to UL Design
No. D501 (using layers of gypsum to protect the steel) and/or P701 (using spray applied fireresistive material - SFRM) to provide one-hour fire resistive ceilings for the exit corridor.
However, the UL Designs were not followed properly (i.e., – SFRM location, thickness, etc.) so
the floor/ceiling assemblies can’t be credited as providing the required occupancy separation or
exit corridor protection. The original Group H areas were re-classified as Group B occupancies
because the SFRM could not be credited. Unprotected steel column and beam construction was
observed in many areas during a recent site visit confirming the Type II-B construction. In
addition, record documents for this building indicates it’s constructed entirely of Type II-B
noncombustible materials in accordance with the 2015-IBC. Figure 16 shows unprotected steel
beams and beams with SFRM applied.

Figure 16 – Unprotected and Protected Steel Beams

8. Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance
8.1. Inspection and Testing
Sandia has its own in-house fire protection maintenance crew. This crew is divided up into
three crafts: fire sprinkler, fire alarm, and fire extinguisher. The fire alarm crew handles all
inspection, testing, and maintenance (ITM) for Sandia’s fire alarm systems. Sandia building
occupants can submit service requests for anything they notice wrong on the system. For
example, a blocked strobe or audible warning not loud enough during a fire drill. In this fashion,
the occupants are the daily basic inspection check for the system. For testing, each fire alarm
system is commissioned in conjunction with the fire protection engineering department to
ensure the systems meet code and function as designed before being accepted. For testing as
part of preventive maintenance requirements, please reference the next section.
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8.2. Preventive Maintenance
NFPA 25 (2014 Edition) is the governing code for fire suppression system testing requirements
for this discussion. At Sandia National Laboratories, the ITM requirements of fire protection
systems has been automated into a software program called Maximo which creates work
orders for maintenance staff to perform work in the field. These work orders are referred to as
PM checklists which stand for preventative maintenance checklists. These PMs (for short) are
divided into four per year, each of which incorporates requirements from NFPA 25. There are
two quarterly PMs, a semiannual PM, and an annual PM per year. The NFPA 25 semi-annual
requirements are placed on that PM (such as verifying that a water flow signal from the
inspector’s test is received at the fire alarm control panel), the quarterly NFPA 25 requirements
on that PM (such as visual inspection of alarm devices), and the annual NFPA 25 requirements
on that PM (visual inspection of sprinkler heads). The Sandia fire alarm maintenance team
performs a yearly preventive maintenance (PM) on each building that has a fire alarm system.
This PM checklist has been made by fire protection engineering to incorporate all the ITM
requirements from NFPA 72. Once completed these PMs will be routed to a Sandia fire
protection engineer for review and disposition. If there are any discrepancies or follow-up
repairs needed, the Sandia FPE makes sure that work gets done in the following few months. By
the time the next annual PM occurs, all follow up actions and repairs from the previous year
should be complete. A typical PM checklist is provided in Appendix M.

9. Emergency Management
9.1. Emergency Access
The PF is located within the TA-I security fence with property security clearance required to
access the facility. Entrance into the East Wing and into the cleanrooms of the North Wing area
is also access controlled. The building is continuously occupied during regular business hours.
The security department and the maintenance personnel have keys to access the locked
mechanical/electrical areas. Fire department vehicle access is provided on all sides of the
building by paved roadways. The closest fire hydrant is approximately 50-ft west of the of the
fire department connection on the south side of the building and approximately 40-ft from the
standpipe and fire department connections on the north side of the building. The power for the
building can be disconnected at the substation, and the shut-offs for the hydrogen and liquid
nitrogen systems are located at the storage tanks.
9.2. Emergency Organizations
9.2.1. Evacuation Teams
An evacuation team for the PF has been organized and based upon the conversations with the
Building Coordinator is in compliance with the Corporate Fire Protection Procedure for Building
Evacuation and Fire Teams.
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9.2.2. Fire Department
The Fire Department response time to the PF is approximately three to five minutes
depending on road and traffic conditions, as estimated by the Kirtland Fire Department. The
closest fire station to PF is Station 1, which is approximately 1½ miles northwest of the
facility.
9.2.3. Emergency Documents
A Pre-Fire Planning program has been developed for the PF.
10.2.4. Disposition of Signals
If an alarm is received at the PF or any other Sandia building, then the Kirtland Air Force Base
Fire Department will respond to the building and extinguish the fire as appropriate. If a trouble
is received at the supervising station, then the fire protection maintenance manager will
dispatch personnel to troubleshoot the system. If a supervisory signal is received then Sandia
emergency operations will investigate and contact Sandia facilities if need-be. In the event of an
alarm at the PF, key management personnel will also be notified and coordinated with to avoid
shutting down production or evacuating personnel if need-be.

10. Prescriptive-Based Analysis Summary
Based upon the aforementioned site surveys, code verification, and review of record
documents, the PF meets the intent of the prescriptive-based requirements of the 2015-IBC
and the LSC. There still remain a few housekeeping and administrative issues that need to be
addressed such as:
•
•
•

Keeping exits clear of obstructions and combustibles.
Enforcement of administrative controls to keep rated doors closed
Limit the use of flammable and combustible liquids

11. Performance-Based Analysis
11.1. Disclaimer
The following performance-based analysis uses hypothetical scenarios to analyze the
building for life safety. The scenarios are intended to be representative of hazards that exist
in laboratory type buildings in general. The scenarios are not intended to identify the size and
location of actual fire hazards. The information in this report is meant to supplement frequent
inspections of the building fire protection system and good housekeeping habits in order to
maintain the optimum level of safety for the occupants and the building. The fire hazards,
calculation assumptions, and pass/fail criteria used for each scenario are conservative in
nature in order to provide a factor of safety to the occupants of the building.
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11.2. Introduction to Performance-Based Egress Analysis
The performance-based analysis is another way determining the life safety of a particular
building; it provides alternatives to how the prescriptive parts of the code can be achieved.
With more flexibility also comes more risk of human error by poor model design, inappropriate
interpretation of the goals, objectives level of safety, appropriate fire scenarios, assumptions,
and safety factors. A performance-based design can be used to prove an equivalent level of
safety if a specific building or life safety code was not met or the building contains unique
features not typically covered by code requirements. A performance-based analysis requires
special consideration when choosing fire scenarios and their respective performance criteria.
The fire scenarios must accurately represent fire hazards that can potentially occur in the
building. The performance criteria must be set to an appropriate threshold in order to ensure
life safety while not being too stringent to make the fire scenarios impossible to pass. The fire
protection engineer should state all assumptions and references in order to give the AHJ
confidence in the analysis.
11.3. Design Fire Scenario Considerations
The following fire scenarios were considered for what could be considered a credible, worstcase fire for the structure:
• Local Fire
• Test apparatus catching fire
• Chemical spill fire
• Atrium, large volume space, high ceiling
• Fully developed, post-flashover fire
• Small/medium compartment fire
The performance-based analysis consisted of ensuring the fire protection systems would
perform under the most likely and statistically most significant fire scenarios for this type of
building (concentrated office area, laboratory and industrial)
The systems must protect all occupants to safely egress and prevent the fire from spreading
beyond the room of origin.
NFPA 101, Section 5.5, has the following eight Design Fire Scenario types:
1. Occupancy Specific/activity related
2. Ultrafast-developing fire in primary means of egress
3. Normally unoccupied room
4. Concealed space next to large unoccupied room
5. Slowly developing fire, shielded from fire protection
6. Most severe Fire/Largest fuel load
7. Outside Exposure Fire
8. Ordinary combustibles/ineffective-unreliable fire protection
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11.4. Design Fire Scenarios
Fire Scenarios 1A and 1B: Kitchen Appliance Fire (LSC Design Fire Scenarios 1 and 8)
Quick Overview
• Location: 1st Floor Kitchenette
• Electrical malfunction is the 3rd leading cause of non-residential fires [1]
• Slow to Moderate-developing fire (LSC)
• Normally unoccupied kitchenette
• Fire caused by ignition of a microwave oven and secondary ignition sources are a wood
table and old-style coffee maker
• Scenario 1A - Sprinklers will be impaired, however smoke detectors and horn/strobe
devices will be active
• Scenario 1B – Sprinklers will not be impaired
The following Design Fire Scenarios were considered, but not evaluated due to time constraints:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Atrium fire
Cleanroom lab coat fire
Lab test apparatus fire
Wood pallet fire on the loading dock
Flammable or combustible gas fire
Forklift fire
Combustible commodity fire in a stairwell
Portable evaporative cooler fire inside the loading dock area

The kitchen appliance fire scenarios evaluated in this report, are considered the statistically
most significant [1] of any of the above referenced possible scenarios. The next potentially
significant fire scenario for the PF would be a lab test appraratus fire and would have been
analyzed if time permitted.
11.5. Codes and References
SFPE Engineering Guide to performance-Based Fire Protection, 2nd Edition
SFPE Handbook of FPE, 4th and 5th Editions (SFPE HB)
2015 Edition, NFPA 101 Life Safety Code (LSC): Chapter 5
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11.6. Facility Description
The unique building characteristics to the PF building was evaluated in order to determine the
most appropriate fire scenarios. The PF building is a multi-program laboratory where various
research efforts are being conducted throughout the building. The building is composed of
office space, cleanrooms, and laboratory areas. The laboratories contain small amounts of
chemicals which are stored in flammable liquid storage cabinets when not in use.
11.7. Building Occupant Descriptions
The majority of the occupants at the PF are engineers, scientists, and staff members who work
in the building five days a week. High-school and college interns work in the building year-round
and especially in the summer. These interns can be less familiar with the building and may be as
young as sixteen. All PF occupants are able-bodied and capable of a reasonable egress time.
Visitors to the building may have physical disabilities that could decrease their movement
times, such as being wheelchair bound, however there would only be a small number of
individuals requiring increased movement time.
11.8. Project Scope
The performance-based analysis will consist of ensuring the fire protection systems for the PF
building will perform through two fire scenarios. The systems must protect all occupants to safe
egress and prevent the fire from spreading beyond the area of origin. The primary stakeholders
are the building owner, the AHJ (DOE), the Building and Fire Safety (BFS) department, the
tenants, the building operations and maintenance, and the emergency responders. The
aforementioned fire scenarios were chosen based on the building and occupant characteristics.
The performance criteria are established from the design goals and objectives. The RSET is
calculated using the method outlined in the SFPE handbook as well as the use of the egress
computer model Pathfinder ®. The fire scenarios will be modeled using the Fire Dynamic
Simulator (FDS) ® program.
11.9. Fire Protection Goals
The SFPE Engineering Guide to Performance Based Design [2] and the stakeholders’ objectives
were used to define the goals of the design project.
•
•
•

Life Safety: Minimize fire-related injuries and prevent undue loss of life.
Property Protection: Minimize fire related damage to the building and its contents
Mission Continuity: Minimize undue loss of operations and business-related revenue due to
fire-related damage.

The goals are intended to be broad statements about how a building is supposed to
perform under a given fire scenario.
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11.10. Stakeholder and Design Objectives
The stakeholders’ objectives are intended to describe the maximum level of damage that they
would be able to tolerate. After the stakeholder’s objectives have been determined, it is
necessary to create design objectives by determining what aspects of the building need to be
protected. The design objectives include acceptable fire conditions that need to be
maintained in order to meet the stakeholders’ objectives.
Stakeholder’s Objectives:
•
•
•

Life Safety: Allow safe egress for all occupants outside the area of origin
Property Protection: Prevent thermal damage
Mission Continuity: Minimize smoke spread

Design Objectives:
•
•
•

Life Safety: Maintain tenable conditions
Property Protection: Prevent flashover
Mission Continuity: Prevent fire from spreading outside the room of origin

11.11. Tenability Criteria
In order to ensure the building occupants remain safe, a tenability criterion is used to set a
tolerable level of exposure during the egress of the building. Table 12 below outlines the limits
used in the analysis for tenability at a height of 6-ft above the occupied floor levels.
Table 12. Tenability Limits

Performance Criteria
Temperature

60℃

Visibility

4m

Radiant Heat Flux

2.5 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘−2 or 375℃

Carbon Monoxide (CO)

Tenability Limit

30,000 ppm/min (1,000 ppm for
30 minutes)

Source
SFPE Handbook 4th Edition 2-129
Table 2-6.20
SFPE Handbook 4th Edition Table
2-4.2 for Familiar Occupants
SFPE Handbook 4th Edition 2-129
Table 2-6.20
NFPA 101

11.11.1. Temperature: <60℃ for >30 minutes
For a smoke layer 6-ft above the walking surface a temperature tenability limit of 60℃ is used.
The tenability limit of 60℃ allows exposure for 30 minutes at that level without it having a life
threatening effect on the egressing occupants (SFPE Handbook 4thEdition Table 2-6.20). Table
13 below, shows the tenability limits for heat.
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Table 13. Tenability Limits for Heat

11.11.2. Visibility: 4 Meters
The smoke layer should not descend before 6 feet above the walking surface. A visibility limit of
4 meters can also be employed for occupants that are familiar with their surroundings (SFPE
Handbook 4th Edition Table 2-4.3). All occupants of the PF building have gone through training
in order to be familiar with their surroundings. Table 14 below, shows the visibility limits.
Table 14. Tenability for Visibility – SFPE HB. Table 2-4.3

11.11.3. Radiant Heat Flux: < 2.5 𝐤𝐤𝐤𝐤/𝐦𝐦𝟐𝟐
The hot smoke layer can produce a radiant heat flux to the occupants walking below it. This
heat flux shall not exceed 2.5 kW/m2 in order to keep occupants from experiencing pain on
exposed skin. In order to stay below this value the smoke layer temperature needs to stay
below 375℃ (SFPE Handbook 4th Edition Figure 2-6.31) as shown in Figure 17 below.
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Figure 17. Heat Flux & Temperature from the SFPE HB. Figure 2-6.31

11.11.4. Carbon Monoxide: 1,000 ppm for 30 minutes
A person’s ability to exit a building is impaired by a decrease in the amount of oxygen in the
building along with the toxic effects that Carbon Monoxide has. NFPA 101 defines a tolerable
amount of CO to be at 1,000 ppm for up to 30 minutes of exposure. This report follows LSC
5.2.2 Method 1 which describes a fractional effective dose (FED) calculation approach. FED
addresses the effects of carbon monoxide, hydrogen cyanide, carbon dioxide, hydrogen
chloride, hydrogen bromide, and anoxia. The LSC lists 0.8 as the non-lethal exposure level;
however there is a need to distinguish FED levels between incapacitation and fatality.
Incapacitation occurs at one-third to one-half of the lethal exposure. Thus, is a FED value of 0.8
were used for non-lethal exposure, a FED of 0.3 would be reasonable for a non-incapacitating
exposure. For a building where an unusually large fraction of the occupants are especially
vulnerable – for example occupants with asthma or other breathing-related issues – the FED
value should be modified to lower levels than stated above. The Authority Having Jurisdiction
(AHJ) must approve the acceptance threshold for the FED level. Purser also describes another
method for estimating time to incapacitation in smoke atmospheres – taking into account
interactions between toxic fire gases. This composition is dependent on the composition of the
actual fire atmospheres, but for most practical situations, CO will be the most important toxic
product. The most important interaction will bean increased rate of CO uptake due to
hyperventilation caused by CO2. The fractional dose equation for asphyxiation would be:
Equation for asphyxiation would equal:
𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁 = [(𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂 + 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶 + 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼N𝑂𝑂𝑥𝑥+ 𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟) ∗𝑉𝑉CO2 + 𝐹𝐹𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐷IO or 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁 = 𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑂2

Where:
FIN = Fraction of an incapacitating dose of all asphyxiant gases
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FICO= Fraction of an incapacitating dose of CO
FICN= Fraction of an incapacitating dose of HCN
FINOx= Fraction of an incapacitating dose of NO + NO2
FLDirr = Fraction of an irritant dose contributing to hypoxia
VCO2= Multiplication factor for CO2-induced hyperventilation
FED10 = Fraction of incapacitating dose of low-oxygen hypoxia
FICO2 = Fraction of an incapacitating dose of CO2
An FIN = 1 is appropriate for incapacitating, and death is predicted at approximately two to
three times the incapacitating dose. A complete tenability analysis can be performed for a
specific fire scenario with data for release rates of smoke, CO and CO2.
11.11.5. Flashover
Room flashover is associated with fire and smoke spread outside the room of origin. When
flashover occurs, the room integrity is compromised and the fire and smoke will no longer be
contained to the room of origin. If smoke were to spread from a room to the corridor, major
egress paths could be compromised. Also, smoke spread could impact the functionality of
highly sensitive test equipment in various laboratories. SFPE HB Sect 3-6 describes how
research conducted by Thomas [3] indicates the onset of flashover is typically represented by
an upper gas layer of 500-600℃. The conservative upper gas layer temperature of 500℃ will be
used for flashover criterion.
11.11.6. Performance Criteria Summary
Table 15 below, summarizes the aforementioned fire protection goals, design objectives and
their respective performance criteria.
Table 15. Summary of Performance Goals, Objectives, and Criteria
Fire Protection
Goal

Stakeholder
Objective

Design Objective

Performance
Criteria
Visibility > 4 m

Minimize fire related
injuries

Allow safe egress for all
occupants outfit the room
of origin

Maintain tenable
conditions

Smoke Layer Height > 1.83m
CO < 1000 ppm
Room Temperature < 60°C

Minimize fire related
damage to the buildings
and its contents
Minimize undue loss of
operation

Prevent thermal damage

Prevent Flashover

Upper Layer Temperature <
500°C

Minimize smoke spread

Prevent fire and smoke
from spreading outside
the room of origin

Upper Layer Temperature <
500°C
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11.12. Egress Analysis
11.12.1. Egress Analysis Introduction
This section will provide the information necessary to calculate the total egress time. The
chosen fire scenarios in the preceding sections of this report contain their own egress analyses
for their respective occupant loads and exiting layouts. An egress analysis is used to calculate
the RSET. The RSET is how long it will take for the occupants to exit the building. The RSET
includes detection time, alarm time, pre-movement time, and travel time. The RSET is then
compared to the ASET in order to determine if occupants have enough time to safely exit the
facility or area. The ASET is calculated by modeling fire scenarios and determining when they
exceed the performance criteria. The ASET must be greater than the RSET in order for a safe
egress to occur. If the ASET is less than the RSET, the building fails the fire scenario and
corrective actions will be recommended to increase the ASET. Figure 18 below, taken from
NFPA HB Fig. 3.11.4, portrays the RSET vs. ASET calculations.

Figure 18–ASET vs. RSET

11.12.2. Egress Calculation Methods
The following steps will be used to calculate the egress time for each chosen fire
scenario:
Determine the occupant load for the room or building (P)
Page | 46

Determine the number of available exit doors from the room or building (D)
Determine effective width of each door (We)
Determine the specific flow of each door (Fs)
Calculate the flow capacity of each door (Fc)
Calculate the time of passage through all available doors (tp)
Determine the pre-movement time (tp-e)
Calculate the detection time (td)
Calculate the exit time (te)
11.12.3. Egress Assumptions
All occupants start egress at the same time. Queuing will occur at the doors to the outside
therefore the specific flow; FS will be the maximum specific flow, FSM. . The population will use
all facilities in the optimum balance. None of the private exits will be considered for the chosen
scenarios.
11.12.4. Pre-movement Time
Pre-movement time is the time it takes an occupant to perform activities prior to leaving the
building. PF occupants are likely to increase their pre-movement time by engaging in the
following activities:
• Finding keys, jackets or purses
• Putting on gloves, hats or heavy jackets (in the winter)
• Taking off safety glasses or lab coats
• Shutting down experiments and/or putting away chemicals
• Locking the computers (a security requirement)
• Looking for a co-worker to egress with
• Interns and new employees looking for mentors for guidance on where to go
The pre-movement time was determined from Table 4.2.1 of the NFPA Handbook (Table
16 below). The mid-rise office building occupancies most closely resemble the PF in
occupant characteristics. The lower median value of 0.6-min. (36-seconds) was chosen due
to the nature of the occupants and the layout of the building.

Page | 47

Table 16. Delay Times – NFPA Handbook

11.12.5. RSET Detection and Notification Times (td) – All Scenarios
The time to detection and notification are combined into the td value as
shown below:
Scenarios 1A and 1B: td = 31s (1st smoke detector activation)
The above detection time was determined through FDS simulations.
11.12.6. RSET Egress Travel/Evacuation Times (te) – All Scenarios
The egress (travel) time of occupants assuming a completely full occupant load using a
Pathfinder ® model (Reference Appendix N) utilizing imported drawings of the floor layout.
Both the Steering and SFPE Models were recorded, but only the travel time utilizing the
Steering Model will be used due to its more realistic nature. The travel times for both egress
models are as follows:
Fire Scenarios 1A and 1B:
Steering Model: 109 seconds (this value is used in the formula for Section 11.12.7 below)
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11.12.7. RSET Pathfinder Calculations – All Scenarios
st

Pathfinder RSET – Steering Model (1 Floor): 109 s (1.82 min.) for 412 occupants
 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑 + 𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝−𝑒𝑒 + 𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒

𝑡𝑡𝑑𝑑 = 31 s (Smoke detector activation plus 2 second lag time)
𝑡𝑡𝑝𝑝−𝑒𝑒 = 36 s (Pre-Movement time previously stated)
𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒 = 109 s (movement time to exits from previous section)

𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 (1𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴) = 31𝑠𝑠 + 36𝑠𝑠 + 109𝑠𝑠 = 𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏𝟏 𝒔𝒔 (𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂𝒂. 𝟑𝟑 𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎)
Where:
td = Time from fire ignition to detection (includes tn)
t p-e= Pre-evacuation (aka Pre-movement time)
te = Time form start of purposive evacuation movement until safety is reached

As noted above, the Pathfinder ® model predicted a total building movement time of 109
seconds. The Pathfinder movement time value compares nicely with the hydraulic model value
from Section 4.7.4 of this report which estimated a movement time of 106 seconds. Appendix N
provides information and screen-shots from the Pathfinder model used for the PF.
11.13. Fire Scenarios
11.13.1. Fire Scenario 1A – Kitchen Appliance Fire (Sprinklers Disabled)
The first design fire originates from the ignition of microwave oven. It is analyzed due to its
more frequent nature than the other scenarios. To complicate this scenario, the sprinklers are
assumed to not work based off Design Scenario 8 of the LSC: an ordinary combustible fire
where the active fire protection is ineffective. The fire alarm system is still assumed to work and
will notify occupants upon activation.
11.13.2. Room Characteristics
This kitchen appliance fire will start in a small kitchen (aka, kitchenette) on the first floor of the
building. This area is normally unoccupied, however occupants can use the area during the day
to heat things up, make coffee, clean dishes, etc. The room does not have a door and opens to
the corridor, which occupants could use for part of their egress from the office area or
conference room. The kitchenette room itself is 8’H x 11.5’L x 5.2’W and the microwave oven
sits on top of a wood table with a coffee maker adjacent to it. The exact room location on the
first floor is shown shaded in blue in Figure 19 below.
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Figure 19 – First Floor Kitchenette Location

There is a photoelectric smoke detector located outside the kitchenette that will activate at
3.28% obscuration. For the first fire scenario, it is assumed the sprinklers are impaired and do
not activate. There are fire extinguishers nearby, but for the purpose of this scenario, it is
assumed that they are not utilized. The hallway and opening to the kitchenette are shown in
Figure 20 below.
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Figure 20 – First Floor Hallway and Kitchenette Location (arrow)

11.13.3. Occupant Characteristics
A complete occupancy load analysis is provided earlier in this report. Occupants are not in this
small room every minute of every day and it remains for the most part unoccupied. PF
occupants are all over sixteen years old, capable of egressing in a reasonable time and familiar
with the building. Based on the aforementioned information, pre-movement times were
determined to be 36 seconds. The movement time for this scenario is based off of testing done
on walking speed in smoke. The maximum walking speed time is approximately 1.2 m/s
maximum with a small extinction coefficient. The furthest distance from the exit is 40.2 ft
meters. Assuming that there are not enough occupants to queue in individual rooms and the
maximum time is spent walking to the exit, the movement time would then equal 34 seconds
(1.2 m/s / 40.2 m). The pre-movement time and the movement time will be added to the time
to alarm time in order to determine the required safe egress time for this scenario. The first
smoke detector activation alarm time was found to be 29 seconds and 2 seconds was added to
that for system lag time. The Pathfinder RSET was previously determined to be 176 seconds, so
this worst-case value will be used for the 1st floor RSET requirement. All of the first floor FDS
model smoke detector activation times are shown in Table 17 below. The smoke detector
labeled “SD” in the table is located in the hallway directly outside of the kitchenette.
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Table 17. FDS Smoke Detector Activation Times

DEVICE Activation Times
1

SD

28.6 S

2

SD01

86.3 S

3

SD02

77.3 S

4

SD03

78.0 S

5

SD04

78.1 S

6

SD05

135.9 S

7

SD06

109.6 S

8

SD07

105.7 S

9

SD08

129.5 S

10

SD09

138.0 S

11.13.4. Fire Characteristics
Heat release rates for wood table and coffee maker fires are known, but those for the primary
ignition source such as the microwave are not, so assumptions had to be made. The first
assumption is that the peak heat release rate is equal to 250kW. This number is intended to be
conservative. For example, a 28” CRT television has a HRR of about 275kW [4] and is made of
similar materials (plastic, electronic components, etc.) as a TV, therefore the HRR of 250kW for
the microwave is conservative. For the coffee maker and microwave oven, the fire is assumed
to be a t2 fire with a medium growth, fast decay rate, and well ventilated. The wood table fire
has a fast growth rate and slow decay. All fire scenarios were run for the full 600 seconds (10min).
As shown in Figures 21 and 22 below, for Scenario 1A, the temperature does not rise above
60°C @ 1.83m (6-ft) in the means of egress or in the room so flashover (500°C) does not occur.
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Figure 21 – Fire Scenario 1A: FDS Temperature @60s
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Figure 22 – Fire Scenario 1A: FDS Temperature @176s (RSET)

As shown in Figures 23, 24, and 25 below, the visibility falls below 4 m in the means of egress at
around 66 seconds (this sets the ASET) in the corridor leading to the exit. All visibility is lost at
176 seconds (RSET).
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Figure 23 – Fire Scenario 1A: FDS Visibility @ 31s
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Figure 24 – Fire Scenario 1A: FDS Visibility @ 66s (ASET)
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Figure 25 – Fire Scenario 1A: FDS Visibility @ 176s (RSET)
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The smoke Layer Height > 6ft (1.83m)-Fails at 45 seconds as shown in Figure 26 below.

Figure 26 – Fire Scenario 1A: FDS Fire Smoke Layer Height
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As shown in Figures 27 and 28 below, the Carbon Monoxide (CO) production is less than our
tenability criteria of 1000 ppm, so it passes. The maximum that it reaches is 300 ppm on the
scale.

Figure 27 – Fire Scenario 1A: FDS CO @ 31s
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Figure 28 – Fire Scenario 1A: FDS CO @ 176s (RSET)
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The smoke migration is shown in Figures 29 and 30 below.

Figure 29 – Fire Scenario 1A: Corridor Smoke Progression Viewpoints @ 29s
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Figure 30 – Fire Scenario 1A: Corridor Smoke Progression Viewpoints @60s
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A results table for Scenario 1A is shown in Figure 31 below.

Temp
Visibility
Smoke Layer Height
CO Level
RSET
0
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200
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400

500

Time (s)
Pre-Movement Time

600

700

Movement Time

Figure 31 – Fire Scenario 1A: RSET vs. ASET Analysis

In summary, Scenario 1A fails the visibility and smoke layer height tenability requirements,
however it passes the CO and temperature criterion so a percentage of the occupants could
potentially exit the building without being overcome with the effects of heat or smoke. It is
important to note that proper inspection, testing and maintenance should be done on all
detection and notification devices and on the sprinkler system to ensure that everything will
operate correctly in the event of a fire emergency.
11.13.5. Fire Scenario 1B – Kitchen Appliance Fire (Sprinklers Active)
The design fire is the same as Fire Scenario 1A, however the sprinklers are assumed to be
operational based off Design Fire Scenario 1 of the LSC: An ordinary combustible fire where the
active sprinkler system is effective in cooling the fire. The fire alarm system is assumed to work
and will notify occupants upon activation.
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As shown in Figures 32 and 33 below, for Scenario 1B, the temperature does not rise above
60°C @ 1.83m (6-ft) in the means of egress or in the room so flashover (500°C) does not occur.

Figure 32 – Fire Scenario 1B: FDS Temperature @60s
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Figure 33 – Fire Scenario 1B: FDS Temperature @ 176s (RSET)
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As shown in Figures 34, 35, and 36 below, the visibility falls below 4 m in the means of egress at
around 128 seconds (this sets the ASET) in the corridor leading to the exit. All visibility is lost at
176 seconds (RSET).

Figure 34 – Fire Scenario 1B: FDS Visibility @ 31s
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Figure 35 – Fire Scenario 1B: FDS Visibility @ 128s (ASET)
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Figure 36 – Fire Scenario 1B: FDS Visibility @ 176s (RSET)
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The smoke Layer Height > 6ft (1.83m)-Fails at 150 seconds as shown in Figure 37 below.

Figure 37 – Fire Scenario 1B: FDS Fire Smoke Layer Height

Page | 69

As shown in Figures 38 and 39 below, the Carbon Monoxide (CO) production is less than our
tenability criteria of 1000 ppm, so it passes. The maximum that it reaches is 95 ppm.

Figure 38 – Fire Scenario 1B: FDS CO @ 31s
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Figure 39 – Fire Scenario 1B: FDS CO @ 176s (RSET)
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Figure 40 – Fire Scenario 1B: RSET vs. ASET Analysis

As shown in Figure 40 above, Scenario 1B fails the visibility and smoke layer height tenability
requirements, however it passes the CO and temperature criterion so a percentage of the
occupants could exit the building without being overcome with the effects of heat or smoke.
11.13.6. Summary
Two of the three criterion fail for Scenario 1A (no sprinklers) and 1B (sprinklers), however
whether or not sprinklers are present, Scenario 1B proves that they do make a considerable
difference with the reduction of the amount of carbon monoxide developed and temperature
produced from the design fire.

12. Performance-Based Design Conclusion
Evacuation times were assessed based on the occupancy load factor of the floors. It was
determined that the building optimal evacuation time is between 2-3 minutes if no exits are
blocked. Based on the design fire scenarios, recommendations are as follows:
•
•
•
•

Keep exits clear of obstructions and potential combustibles
Limit amount of secondary combustibles (i.e., wood table) in kitchenette
Replace suspect, old, or malfunctioning appliances
Ensure a fire watch is implemented any time the sprinkler system is impaired
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13. Conclusion
This report evaluated both the prescriptive and performance-based designs of the Production
Facility. The prescriptive-based design applied to this building was covered and summarized in
detail with an overview and review of the structural, egress, sprinkler, fire alarm, and building
construction systems for the PF. The designs have been evaluated and discussed against the
current adopted codes, standards, and DOE requirements.
The performance-based analysis of this report focused on evaluating how effective the
performance-based requirements were in providing life safety for the occupants. It was found
that the fire protection systems were not totally adequate for the building for both scenarios.
Both scenarios failed to maintain the tenability conditions for the occupants during evacuation
of the building. The performance-based analysis showed that visibility was the limiting
condition for both scenarios.
There were deficiencies that were found that need to be addressed to meet current code
requirements. The waterflow test is outdated and a new test will need to be conducted to
ensure the water supply is still adequate for the facility requirements. Sprinkler system
drawings and hydraulic calculations are incomplete or outdated and need to be reconstituted.
Numerous items are located in the corridors and need to be removed to ensure adequate
egress capacity and occupant egress safety.
The building construction meets the requirements for floor area and height limitations. The
occupancy separations and fire-resistive wall construction was determined to be code
compliant.
The egress system was determined to be code compliant. The number of exits for the first floor
was determined to be more than adequate for the occupant load of the building. The common
path of travel and travel distances were found to be code compliant.
The fire sprinker design for the PF meets the requirements in NFPA 13 and DOE orders and
standards. There are no major open findings or deficiencies related to the sprinkler design and
installation.
The fire alarm system was designed and installed in accordance with NFPA 72 and DOE orders
and standards. There are no major open findings, however there are areas in the building that
have slightly deficient alarm decibel readings. A test of the audible devices will need to be made
in order to adjust the sound levels of the installed devices.
The next section lists several recommendations for the fire protection systems of the PF. These
recommendations will be evaluated by engineering personnel and service requests will be
issued for contractors or SNL maintenance personnel to make necessary repairs.
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14. Recommendations
Table 18 below, shows the recommendations of this report. The biggest issue is the placement
of furniture and tripping hazards in the corridors of the facility. Once administrative controls
are in place to mitigate these issues, then occupant egress time and occupant safety will be
greatly improved.
Table 18. Recommendations
Recommendation

Reason

1

Replace ordinary response
sprinklers with quick response

Some of the Cleanrooms have ordinary response automatic sprinklers and
due to high air velocities, quick response are required. There are some
areas where this issue has already been resolved.

2

Perform Waterflow Test

The flow test used for analysis is out of date by 4-years. NFPA requires
recent flow test data to be used. Due to scheduling issues, a new flow test
has not yet been able to be performed.

3

Reconstitute sprinkler hydraulic
calculations

Due to the unavailability of complete, updated sprinkler drawings and
numerous sprinkler modifications over the life of the system, a sprinkler
system evaluation should be done on each of the two systems serving the
main building. This should include a complete set of drawings and
hydraulic calculations that include all modifications that have been made to
date.

4

Perform fire alarm audible test of
entire bldg.

Based on audible dB readings within the last few years, some of the areas
of the building are deficient in coverage.

5

Relocate items located in
corridors

Recycling bins, news racks, tables, etc.
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